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Risk Sharing Through Breach of Contract Remedies
ABSTRACT
This paper examines the sharing of risk under three different remedies
for breach of contract. The risk considered arises from the possibility
that, after a seller and buyer have entered into an agreement for the
exchange of some (not generally available) good, a third party who values
the good more than the original buyer may come along before delivery has
occurred; the seller will want to breach. It is shown that this risk is
optimally allocated by the expectation damage remedy if the seller is
risk neutral and the buyer is risk averse, by the fic performance
remedy if the opposite is true, and by a liquidated damage remedy if
both parties are risk averse. The level of damages under the liquidated
damage remedy is also shown to be bounded by the expectation measure of
damages and a "damage equivalent" to the specific performance remedy.
By means of a numerical example, it is shown that use of the prevailing
remedy for breach of contract——the expectation damage remedy——may plausibly







Whenever parties enter into a contract they realize
that circumstances may change and that one of them may want
to breach the contract.The remedy available against a
breaching party will,of course, influence each pnrtys
decision whether to breach.The remedy will also affect
each party s investment in "rel iance"——expenditures made in
anticipation of performance (e.g.,building a warehouse to
store the goods to be delivered). These effects of contract
remedies have been thoroughly examined by Shavell (1980a,
198Db), Rogerson (1980), and others.The remedy for breach
will,as well, allocate therisksamong thepartiesdue to
changed circumstances. This effect, whichhas not been
examinedas systematicallyas theothers, is thesubject of
this paper.1
The risk allocation effects of three contract remedies
will be analyzed in the context of anexample a buyer and
aseller of a good (not generally available in the market)
whoboth know that some third party who values the goodmore
thanthe original buyer may come along before delivery
occurs. Under the PxjectnUon dnmaqp remedy, if a third—
partyoffer materializes and the seller breaches, the buyer
can sue the seller for his lost profits (the parties are
assumedto be firms) .Underthe pcific rformance
remedy, the buyer can sue the seller for delivery of the
good.And under a liqjidated dnmae remedy, thebuyer can
sue the seller for anamountagreed to by the parties inPAGE L4
advance,which may exceed the lost profits of the buyer.2
The conclusions reached in this paper may be easily
summarized.Under the expectation damage remedy, the buyer
is, by definition, made indifferent between performance and
breach.Thus, since this remedy insures the buyer against
the risk of nonperformance and leaves the beneficial risk of
selling to the third party entirely on the seller,it
optimally allocates the contract risks only when the buyer
is risk averse and the seller is risk neutral.
In terms of risk allocation, the specific performance
remedy is the mirror image of the expectation damage remedy.
If the higher third—party of for material ies ,thebuyer will
demand performance in order to resell to the third party.
Thus,the seller's profits do not dependonthepossibility
ofa thi rd—party offer andthebuyer bears this beneficial
risk.This remedy optimally allocates the contractrisks
onlywhen the seller is risk averse and the buyer is risk
neutral.
Beforeconsidering therisk allocationeffects of a
liquidated damage remedy,it willbe usefulto reinterpret
the specificperformance remedy. Assume for simplicity that
thereisan upper boundtowhat a third party might offer
forthe good.Then the specific performance remedy is
equivalent to a damage remedy in which the amount paid to
the buyer if breach occurs equals this upper bound——the
sellerwill always perform.
A liquidated damage remedy may now be viewed as aPAGE 5
compromise between the extremes of the other two remedies.
Theliquidated damage amountcanbe greaterthanthe
expectation damage award——so that the buyer bears some of
the beneficial risk of a third—party of±er——but less than
the damage equivalent to the specific performance remedy——so
that the seller also bears some of this beneficial risk.It
willbe shown that a liquidated damage agreement optimally
allocates the contract risks when both the buyer and the
seller are risk averse and that the optimal liquidated
damage award is bounded by the expectation measure of
damages and the damage equivalent to specific performance.
A numericalexample is also developedto illustrate
concretely how the optimal liquidated damage agreement
varies with the risk aversion of the parties.
As far as risk sharing is concerned, the preceding
discussion suggests that a liquidated damage remedy should
be the normal remedy if,asI assume, parties are generally
risk averse at least to some extent.In practice, however,
the expectation damage remedy is the normal remedy.3 The
loss of welfare due to inappropriate risk sharing from
relying on the expectation damage remedy rather than a
liquidated damdge remedy (or the specific performance remedy
when the buyer is risk neutral and the seller is risk
averse) is calculated from the numerical example.The loss
ranges in this example from 2% of the value of the contract
(when the buyer is much more risk averse than the seller) to
20% of the valueof the contract (when the buyer is riskPAGE 6
neutraland the seller is very risk averse).Reasons why
the expectation damageremedy might stillbe preferred,
despite thegenerallysuperior risk sharing effects ofa
liquidated damage remedy,are discussed in a concluding
sectionof thepaper.
2.Thetic'dei
Thecontractsituation described here is the simplest
oneimaginable which still allows discussion of the risk
sharing issues. Aseller and a buyer enter into an
agreement in which the seller promises to produce a good for
deliveryto thebuyer at some price paid in advance.Both
partiesare assumed to know the probability thata third
party will come along and the amount that would be offered.
In the event of breach,the buyer's remedy is either
expectation damages——the benefit tothe buyer ifthe
contract were completed——or specificperformance or a
liquidated damage payment agreed to by the parties in
advance.'
Thefollowingnotation will be used:
utility of the seller (U > 0, Ii"0, U(0) =0)
V(.) utility of the buyerCV' > 0, V" ￿ 0)
c seller's production cost
y buyer's benefit if contract completed Cy >c)
k contract price
p probability of third—party offerPAGE 7
amountof third—party offer (z >y)
damage payment to buyer if breach occurs
It is obvious (since z >y)that the first—best outcome
is for the good to end up in the possession of the third
party ifthethird—party offer materializes.Thiswill
occur regardless of the remedy used.Thus, the only issue
here is how to bcst allocate the beneficialrisk of the
third—party offer between the buyer and the seller. 6
Thebuyer's expected utility EV is:
(1) EV (1—p ) V ( y—I:) +pV( —k)
Thefirstterm reflects theoutcome if the third—partyoffer
does notoccur,whilethe second term represents theoutcome
if theofferc1os occur andthe sellerbreaches andpays
damages. (Inthecase of specific performance, in
equation (1) is the"damage oquivalent"——see below.)
Similarly, the seller's expected utility EU is:
(2) EU ( 1—p)U(k—c) +pU(z+k—c—).
The optimal contract terms——the contract price and the
damage payment——can be determined by maximizing theexpected
utilityof thebuyersubject to theconstraintthat the
expectedutility of theseller equals some constant, say
zero:7
(3) Maximize EV subject to EU 0.
Formulating (3) as a Lagrange multiplier problem, the
first—order conditions(a uniqueinterior solution is
assumed) with respect to handare, respectively:
(4) —(1—p)Vt(y—k) —pV'(3 —k)
(continued)PAGE 8
-XEC1-p)U' (k—c) +pU'(z+k-c-) 10,
(5) pV'(—k)+AIpU'(z+k-c-3) 10,
whore Xis the Lagrangemultiplier. Solving (5)for Xand
substituting this into (ti)leads,after some simplification,
to:
6 ) V 'Cy—k )= U'(k—c
V'(—k)
This condition can begiven afamiliar interpretation: the
marginal rates of substitution between the "goods" of
"incomeif Performance occurs" and "income if breach occurs"
must be the same for both parties.The remaining first—
order condition, with respect to A,isof course the
constraint that the seller's expected utility is zero:
(7)( 1—p)U(k--c) +pU(z+k—c—)0.
Conditions (6) and (7) together determine the optimal damage
payment, *,andthe optimal contract price, k*.
The optimal breach of contract remedy will be said to
be the expectation damage remedy if *y, the specific
performance remedy if * z(thisis the "damage
equivalent" to specific performance),° and a liquidated
damage remedy if y < <
3. i tJ
Theanalysis ofthe remedies when at least one of the
parties is risk averse'0 is presented in thissectionin the
form of three propositions.Since the intuition behind
these results has beendiscussed in the introductoryPAGE 9.
section, no further comments will be made here about the
optimal remedies. However,following each proposition,
therewillbe a brief discussion of the optimal contract
price.
.osition1: If heyer , riskaverseand the
SLLLI. JJIDfLL iiim Lr Ji1pi
.ptimal1 n1loctps the contract riJc ( *= y).11
Proof:Sincetheselleris risk neutral, Ti' ( .) =
constant.Thus,(6)reduces to:
(8) V'(—k)V'(y—k).
Since V' declines continuously,(8) implies that =y.
Q. E. D.
Inthis case, the optimal contractpriceis:
(9)k c p(z—y)<c.12
The seller is willincT to accept a contractprice below his
productioncostsince, under theexpectationdamage remedy,
hereceives more than his production cost if thethird—party
offer materializes.To be precise, he is willing to accept
a contract price less than production cost to the extent of
the expected gain from the third—party offer,p(—y).
Propo cit ion 2:Lf the seller is risk vprse and the
h u y er is risk noutr al, thn the pecificp erformancemed
pji maij Llaj the contract ri s ks( *= z).'
Proof:Since thebuyeris riskneutral,(6) becomes
(10) U'(k—c) =
whichimplies that z. Q.E.D.
In thiscase,the optimal contract price is:0.1
PAGE 10
(11)
The seller demands a contract price equal to his production
cost since, under the Specific performance remedy,he
receives none of the benefits of a third—party of for.
£Qpjiipji .;.iL J!SLUIrJi±si .LJ bs.a
1i g uidatpd damaqj? remd opt i.maijj aUocats thacj.
LLa.The p _rnal 1igjiida ted dmaçjj￿ p a y ment kinites!.jy
ihp_tiL±cLa pjjjpj niuL .Ui'J J. uuia
fQ!JJjaieflt to Jeçific penrmfl (y < * < )1S
Proof: This will be proved by contradiction. Suppose
y. Then, by the declining marginal utility of V and U,
Vt (y—k)/V' ( —k) 1 andU' (k—c)/U' (+k-c—) >1. This
contradicts (6). Similarly, if ￿ z, thenV'(y—k)/V'(—k)>
land U'(k—c)/U'(+k—-) ￿1, again contradicting (6).
Thus, y << .Q.E.D.
Inthis cése, theoptimalcontract price is boundedby
thecontract prices under theexpectationdamage remedy and
thespecificperformance remedy:
(12) c—p(—y)<k < c.16
Theexactcontract price depends, ofcourse,onthe optimal
liquidated damage payment. Thehigher the damage payment,
thehigher the contract price demandedby thesellersince
his expected gain fromthe third—party offeris less.17
4. An Fxample
The way inwhich the optimal damagepaymentand thePAGE 11
optimal contract price vary withthe riskaversion ofthe
partiescan be illustrated by anexample.The utility
functionsof the seller and of the buyer are assumed to be
of the quadratic form:
(13) U(x) x sx2,
1I) V(x) x —hx2,
wheres ￿ 0 and b ￿ 0 are risk aversionparameters.A 2ero
valueof the parameter corresponds to risk neutrality,and
the higher the value, the more risk averse is theparty. 18
The remaining data for the example are:19
$500 seller's production cost
$1,000 buyer'sbenefit ifcontract completed
.05 probabilityof third—party offer
$10,000 amount of third—party offer
Thus,theexpectationmeasure ofdamages is$1,000andthe
damage equivalent to specific performance is $10,000.
Table1 shows the opt imal damage payment,*,and the
optimal contract price, k*, for different degi-ces of risk
aversion of the seller and the buyer.The values of the
risk aversion parameter are chosen so that thecertainty
equivalent of a50—50 chance ofzero or $10,000 is$5,000,
$L,500,etc.2° For the firstcolumn in Table 1,inwhich
the buyer is risk averse and the selleris riskneutral,
Proposition1 and (9)imply that *=$1,000andk*$50
(theexpected gain to the sellerofthe third—party offer,
p(z—y), is $L5Q)Forthe first row, in which the buyer is
risk neutral and the seller is risk averse, Proposition 2PAGE 12
and(11)implythat*= $10,000and k* =$500. For the
remaining cases,in which bothpartiesare risk averse,
ranges between $1,000 and $10,000 (the low and highvalues
are $3, 152 and $7,6tfl) andk*ranges between $50 and $500
(the low andhighvalues are $195 and $395),as expected
from Proposition 3 and (12). Note that, holding the buyer's
riskaversion constant, both the damage payment and the
contractprice riseas theseller's riskaversion
increases——thereby reducing the (beneficial) risk imposed on
the seller.Conversely, holding the seller's risk aversion
constant, the damage payment and contract price both fall as
the buyer's risk aversion increases.
As mentioned in the introduction,the expectation
damage remedy is the normal remedy in practice.However,
only when the seller is risk neutral does this lead to the
optimal allocation of the contract risk.In every other
case,use of theexpectation remedy lowers at least one of
theparty's expected utility below what it otherwise could
be. Since theseller'sexpected utility is held constant,
this welfare loss can be calculated as the difference
between thevalue to the buyer, w*,of the optimal contract
andthe value to the buyer, e,of a contract with the
expectationremedy, =y,andthecorrespondingcontract
price(9).In other words, the welfare loss is w —we,
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Note: See text for details.
a/ Any k >0andsatisfying 3 =20kis optimal.PAGE 13
Table 2 shows the absolute welfare loss, as well as the
welfare loss as a percentage of the value of the optimal
contract,w*,from using the expectation damage remedy
rather than a liquidated damage remedy (or the specific
performance remedy when the buyer is risk neutral and the
seller is risk averse).In the case most favorable to the
expectation damage remedy——when the buyer is most risk
averse (certainty equivalent of $3,000 in Table 2) and the
seller is only slightly risk averse (certainty equivalent of
$4,500)——the welfare loss represents a 2Y reduction in the
value of the contract.In the case least favorable to the
expectati on damage remedy——when the buyer is risk neutral
and the seller is most risk averse——the welfare loss
corresponds to a 20 reduction in the value of the contract.
Thus, the example suqgests that in plausible circumstcinces
the inappropriateallocation of contract risks under the
expectation damageremedycan be of some importance.
5. Concluding Remnrkr,
Assuming that parties to a contract are risk averse to
some extent——even ifonly slightly——the analysis inthis
paper argues for use of a liquidated damage remedy. Why is
it then that the normal remedy imposedbythecourts is the
expectationdamage remedy? Considerations of information,
breach,and reliance——not included inthemodel used













The specificperformance remedy requires no information
in order to be implemented by a court, whilethe expectation
damage remedy only requires thecourtto know (or to
estimate)the buyer's benefit if the contract had been
completed.A liquidated damage remedy, however, encourages
the parties to take into account every facet of the contract
when negotiating the damage payment in advance, including
their relative aversion to risk and the likelihood and
magnitude of thi rd—party offers.
If the parties can renegotiate (including with a third
party) when circumstances have changed,then allof the
remedies will leadto efficient breachdecisions.However,
when renegotiation is impossible (or very costly), Shavell
(l9SOa, p.433) has 3hown that only the expectation damage
remedy will induce efficient breach decisions.It is clear
from the results presented here that a liquidated damage
remedy would lead to too few breaches since damages are
higher than under the expectation remedy,and that the
specific performance remedy would be even worse.
Iithe parties negotiate over all terms ofa contract,
includingeach other's reliance decisions, thenallof the
remedies willlead toefficient reliancedecisions.
However,when it is too costly to include the reliance
decision as one of the terms of the contract,Shavell
(1980a, p. 473) has shown that the expectation damage remedy
leads to too much reliance, while Rogerson (1980, pp. 47—48)
hasdemonstrated that the sPecificperformance remedy isPAGE 15
better,and that a liquidated damage remedy is best.
Whenthese additionalconsiderations are takeninto
account,it is clear that no one remedy for breach of
contractis best in everyrespect. It maybe that, all
thingsconsidered,the expectation clamaqe remedy usually
willcomeout on top,although one can imagine pnusib1e
situationsin whichrisksharing considerations may be of
primary importance and in which one of the other remedies
may be preferable.PAGE 16
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computingtheexamples.
1)The studies which have emphasized the role of risk
allocation in contract law have focused on the doctrines of
excuse, impossibility andforesecability rather than,as
here,the remediesfor breach. See, for example, Posner and
Rosenfielcl (1977), Joskow(19),and Perloff (1981,
forthcoming). Several studies have also considered the risk
allocation effects of breach of contract remedies, although
not in the way developed here.The ones which are most
closely related to the present analysis are by Kornhauser
(1980, 1981), Rogerson C 1980), and Shavell ( 1980a,1980b)
See also Goetz and Scott (1977).These will be discussed
further below.
2)It will be shown below that the liquidated damage
payment agreed to by the parties will never be less than the
buyer's lost profits.
3) See, for example, Farnsworth (1970).PAGE 17
) In practice, theexpectationdamage and specific
performance remedies are imposed upon the parties by a
court,whereas aliquidated damage remedy is determined by
thepartiesthemselves.This distinction will not be of
concern here.
5)It will be shown below that the damage payment
under the expectation and liquidated damage remedies will be
lessthzin the third party's offer.Thus, under these
remedies the seller will breach and resell to the third
party.Under the specificperformanceremedy,the buyer
will demand performance and then resell to the third party.
6)Alternatively,one couldmotivate the risk
alloction problem by assuming that there is some detrimental
risk, such as the possibility that the value of performance
to the buyer decreases (say because the good is defective).
Results analogous to the ones developed here could be
generated. See !<ornhauser (1981, pp. 15—17).
7)There is anatural interpretation of the constraint
thatthe seller's expected utility is 2ero. Suppose there
are many potential sellers who competefor the contract to
producea custom—made good for the buyer.Thus, if all
sellers had the same utility function,competition would
lead to the same expected utility for each seller. And ii
sellers have an option of earning zero profits in a riskiess
activity then, since U(O) =0, EU =0is the appropriatePAGE 18
commonlevel of expected utility.
8) If =z,the seller would be indifferent between
performanceandbreachifthethi rd—partyoffer
materializes.It will be assumed that performance will
occurin thisease.Obviously, any> z would also be
equivalentto specific performance.
9)In principle, aliquidated damage agreement could
leadto< y.Itis shownbelow that, in fact, this would
never occur.
10) Whenbothparties are risk neutral, all three
remedies are equally desirable (which is not surprising
since theonly problem considered in this paperis how to
optimally allocate risk).
H) This result has beennoted by several others.See
Kornhauser(1981, pp.15—18),Rogerson (1980, pp. 4—5),
and Shavell (1980a, pp. 487—88; 198Db, p. 13).
12) Without loss of generality, assume U(x) =x. Then
(9) follows directly from (7).
13)This result has been suggested by Shave].l (1980b,
p. 33).In a different model (see footnote 6above),
}ornhauser (1981, pp.16—17) has stated an analogue to this
res u 1 t.
1t)Given S =, theseller's expected utility is U(k—
c). Then (11) follows from U(0) =0.PAGE 19
15) Nornhauser (1980,Pp.12—19;1981,PP.16—19)
discusses thedesirabilityof aliquidated damage remedy
when both parties to a contract are risk averse, but does
notrelate the optimal liquidated damage payment to the
expectation damage or specific performance remedies.Goet
andScott (1977)also advocate use ofa liquidated damage
remedy,but their primary concern is with protecting
'idiosyncratic" and other difficult to measure losses, which
is not an issue here.
16)Since the seller is risk averse, his expected
pfits must be positive when his expected utilityis zero:
(1—p)(k—c) +p(+k—c—)>0.
The first inequality In (12) followsdirectly from this
condition.Ifk ￿c,the seller's expected utility is
positive since U(k—c) ￿ 0 and U(+k—c—ó) >0.The second
inequality in (12) follows from the fact thatthis would
contradictthe zero expected utility constraint.




18) Thevaluesof sand b are limited to ranges such
that U' (x) =1—2sx> 0 and V' Cx) 1 —2bx> 0. Although
thequadratic utility function does not exhibit decreasing
absolute risk aversion,this does not lead to peculiar
results in thepresentapplication.PAGE 20
19) These values guaranteethatthesellerwill produce
the good and enter intoacontract withthebuyer(rather
than,for exanple,producing thegoodsolely for the
possibilityof selling it to the third party).
20)The values of1, ands used(nndthe corresponding
certaintyequivalents) are 0 ($5,000),.000016307 ($4,5OO),
.D00029t12 ($t,UUD), .000039735 ($3,500), and .0000q3780
($3,000).PAGE 21
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